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Since 1945: 25 interstate wars, battle deaths approx. 3-8 million
Since 1945: 240 civil wars in almost half of the UN countries, of
which 114 with more than 1000 dead. In 2015 we have 24 ongoing
civil wars + 9 internationalized civil wars.
A death toll of around 20m as a direct result.
Plus 12-25 million civilian non-combatant casualties (estimated
by the Political Instability Task Force, 2010)
We also have forced displacements (43 million people in 2014,
UN).
But less violent forms of social conflict also produce very large
social losses.
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The Ubiquity of Internal Conflict
There are two remarkable facts about social conflict that de-
serve notice:
First, within-country conflicts account for an enormous share of
deaths and hardship in the world today.
Why so much destructive conflict?
Second, internal conflicts often appear to be ethnic in nature
rather than driven by economic class differences.
Why ethnicity and not class?
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For most of the 20th C class struggle, or more generally, eco-
nomic inequality has been viewed as the main driver of social con-
flict in industrial or semi-industrial society.
This clearly is Marx’s dominant influence in the social sciences. In
Sen’s [1972] words: “the relation between inequality and rebellion
is indeed a close one”.
Intuitive as it might seem, this relationship has garnered no
empirical endorsement. Possibly hundreds of empirical tests have
failed to find a link between social conflict and various indices of
economic inequality, notably the Gini index.
But is income inequality the adequate concept?
0-9
Does income inequality capture social antagonisms?
The Principle of Progressive Transfers:
If we take away one unit of income from one person and transfer it
to another person with lower income, inequality has to come down.
0-10
Does income inequality capture social antagonisms?
The Principle of Progressive Transfers:
If we take away one unit of income from one person and transfer it
to another person with lower income, inequality has to come down.
Indeed all inequality indices go down because the new Lorenz
curve dominates the initial one.
It is equivalent to second order stochastic dominance and to Lorenz
curve dominance.
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But suppose that we apply the transfers separately among the
rich and among the poor, [or among men and women, local and
immigrants...]
All measures of inequality will say that inequality has come
down.
Observe the new distribution
0-14
Example: progressive transfers and their effect on the Lorenz curve 
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Polarization and social antagonism
The new distribution might have less inequality, but it is more
polarized.
This is the reason why inequality measures fail to capture the
degree of social antagonism.
The index of polarisation is designed to measure the sum of all
interpersonal antagonisms in society.
This index is based on the idea that the antagonism between
any two individuals is driven by: (i) the alienation between them
and by (ii) the group identity felt by this individual.
Social conflict is between well defined homogenous groups that
feel alien to each other.
We derive an index of polarisation from three axioms.
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If we agree that the three axioms capture how this measure should
react to these changes, there is one and only one measure that
behaves accordingly
P =
∑
i
ni
∑
j
nj [nidij ] =
∑
i
∑
j
n2injdij .
Population size of each group: ni
Alienation of individuals of group i with respect to j: dij.
For continuous distributions the index is
∫ ∫
|x− y|f (x)2f (y)dxdy.
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Etnicity and Civil Conflict
Maybe research has failed to find anything with respect to class
conflict because has focused on the wrong index. [We shall come
back to this].
Even if our previous point is correct, the fact is that internal
conflicts often appear to be ethnic in nature. More than half of
the civil conflicts have been recorded as ethnic or religious.
This case-based evidence has had an enormous influence on the
way of thinking about the main drivers of civil conflict:
D. Horowitz, author of a monumental treatise on the subject
of ethnic conflict, observes that “In much of Asia and Africa, it
is only modest hyperbole to assert that the Marxian prophecy has
had an ethnic fulfilment”.
Brubaker and Laitin (1998), “...the eclipse of the left-right ide-
ological axis.”
Do “ethnic divisions” predict conflict within countries?
If this were true, how shoud we interpret such a result?
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This is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index
F =
∑
i
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Has been a most used index of ethnic diversity. Intuition.
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How to measure ethnic diversity in a society?
Fractionalization
This is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index
F =
∑
i
ni(1− ni),
Has been a most used index of ethnic diversity. Intuition.
First contributions to the study of the role of ethnicity in civil
conflicts used fractionalisation:
Easterly and Levine (1997), Collier (2001), Collier and Hoﬄer
(2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Miguel et al. (2004) or Mon-
talvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). Blattman and Miguel (2010).
But, ethnic fractionalization has been found not to be statistically
significant in explaining conflict.
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Instrumentalist: Ethnicity is used as a marker to achieve other
goals: political or economic benefits. Economic/social antagonism
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Why is ethnicity relevant?
Primordialist: Ancestral hatred. Huntington.
Instrumentalist: Ethnicity is used as a marker to achieve other
goals: political or economic benefits. Economic/social antagonism
might find its expression via ethnicity. Easier identification.
What goals drive ethnic conflicts?
Greed: the main goal is to appropriate rents after controlling
the state.
Grievance: the main goal is the ethnic pride or revenge for
ancestral grievances.
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model that permits a more systematic view on the determinants of
ethnic conflict. Notice that ethnic means non-economic marker.
How is conflict modelled? Intuitive explanation.
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In order to answer these questions we have defined a formal
model that permits a more systematic view on the determinants of
ethnic conflict. Notice that ethnic means non-economic marker.
How is conflict modelled? Intuitive explanation.
Main ingredients:
The ethnic groups in society, their size, and how alien feel
from each other. [Narodov Mira atlas, recently geo-referenced and
Ethnologue for cultural distances.]
The benefits from conquering power: socio/political and eco-
nomic.
Socio/political: political repression pi
Economic: size of rents controlled from the government µ per
capita.
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Solving the model, we obtain that in equilibrium:
c′(ρ)ρ
pi + µ
≈ α[λP + (1− λ)F]+ (1− α)λG
N
+
Constant
N
Meaning of LHS: ρ is resources wasted per capita
Meaning of RHS: λ= pi
pi+µ , α = commitment to the group.
• We have derived from the model that the relation between
conflict intensity and the distributional measures is linear.
• When group concern is maximal, α = 1, only F and P play a
role. With pure egoism, α = 0, only G matters [but G/N is
negligeable].
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Solving the model, we obtain that in equilibrium:
c′(ρ)ρ
pi + µ
≈ α[λP + (1− λ)F]+ (1− α)λG
N
+
Constant
N
Meaning of LHS: ρ is resources wasted per capita
Meaning of RHS: λ= pi
pi+µ , α = commitment to the group.
• We have derived from the model that the relation between
conflict intensity and the distributional measures is linear.
• When group concern is maximal, α = 1, only F and P play a
role. With pure egoism, α = 0, only G matters [but G/N is
negligeable].
• When conflict is on a public good, λ = 1, only G and P and
with a purely private payoff, λ = 0, only F matters.
• With λ = α = 1 P is the only relevant indicator for conflict.
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Empirical implementation
We study 138 countries over 1960–2008, with the time period
divided into five-year intervals. That yields a total of 1125 obser-
vations (in most cases).
Conflict intensity
As death toll: PRIO dataset.
prio-c is equal to 0 if the country is at peace in those five years; to
1 if it has experienced low-intensity conflict (more than 25 battle
related deaths but less than 1000) in any of these years, or to
2 if the country has been in high-level conflict (more than 1000
casualties) in any of the five years.
As social unrest: the Index of Social Conflict, isc, computed by
the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive.
It provides a continuous measure of several manifestations of social
unrest with no threshold dividing “peace” from “war”. The index
isc is formed by taking a weighted average over eight different
manifestations of internal conflict, such as politically motivated
assassinations, riots, guerrilla warfare, etc.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable prio-c isc prio-c isc prio-c isc
P
∗∗∗
5.16
(0.001)
∗∗∗
19.50
(0.002)
- 1.48
(0.606)
- 16.33
(0.227)
- 1.47
(0.701)
- 23.80
(0.212)
F
∗
0.93
(0.070)
∗
3.56
(0.061)
0.76
(0.196)
0.31
(0.878)
0.87
(0.403)
- 0.16
(0.710)
Pλ
∗∗∗
11.174
(0.003)
∗∗∗
61.89
(0.001)
F (1− λ) ∗ 1.19
(0.097)
∗∗∗
10.40
(0.000)
Pλα
∗
12.65
(0.087)
∗∗∗
90.32
(0.010)
F (1− λ)α 2.54
(0.164)
∗∗
13.15
(0.018)
gdppc
∗∗
- 0.34
(0.047)
∗∗∗
- 2.26
(0.004)
∗
- 0.36
(0.080)
∗∗∗
- 3.02
(0.001)
- 0.25
(0.375)
∗∗∗
- 3.68
(0.007)
pop
∗∗∗
0.24
(0.000)
∗∗∗
1.14
(0.000)
∗∗∗
0.21
(0.001)
∗∗∗
1.30
(0.000)
∗
0.09
(0.166)
∗∗
1.29
(0.013)
nr - 0.27
(0.178)
- 0.53
(0.497)
- 0.00
(0.570)
0.00
(0.432)
∗∗
0.00
(0.011)
∗
0.00
(0.090)
mount 0.00
(0.537)
0.02
(0.186)
0.00
(0.362)
∗
0.03
(0.061)
∗
0.01
(0.060)
∗∗
0.05
(0.020)
ncont
∗∗∗
1.06
(0.001)
∗∗∗
4.55
(0.001)
∗∗
0.77
(0.026)
∗∗∗
4.28
(0.001)
∗∗∗
1.37
(0.004)
∗∗∗
5.89
(0.000)
politics 0.18
(0.498)
0.29
(0.789)
- 0.00
(0.328)
∗∗
- 0.00
(0.026)
0.00
(0.886)
- 0.00
(0.374)
lag
∗∗∗
1.99
(0.000)
∗∗∗
0.46
(0.000)
∗∗∗
1.94
(0.000)
∗∗∗
0.44
(0.000)
∗∗∗
1.84
(0.000)
∗∗∗
0.40
(0.000)
const - 0.90
(0.915)
- 9.19
(0.398)
- 15.40
(0.328)
(Pseudo)-R2 0.35 0.43 0.36 0.44 0.40 0.43
Observations 1125 1111 1104 1090 447 443
Countries 138 138 138 138 53 53
Table 1: Ethnicity and Conflict.
Notes. All specifications employ region and time dummies, not
shown explicitly. p-values are reported in brackets. Robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering have been employed to
compute z-statistics. Columns [1], [3] and [5] are estimated by
maximum likelihood in an ordered logit specification, and
columns [2], [4] and [6] by OLS. gdppc: log of gross domestic
product per-capita; pop: log of population; nr: a dummy for
oil and/or diamonds in Columns 1 and 2 and oil reserves
per-capita (oilrsvpc) for columns [3]–[6]; mount: percentage of
mountainous territory; ncont: non-contiguous territory, see
text; politics is democ in columns [1] and [2] and the index pub
times gdppc (the numerator of λ) for the remaining columns;
lag: lagged conflict in previous five-year interval.
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What have we learned on conflict?
Significant and strong links between ethnicity and conflict.
The theory allows us to draw additional interesting inferences:
Conclusive evidence that monetary gains, “greed”, is not the
only significant driver: public payoffs are significant and very im-
portant. Otherwise only fractionalization would matter. Theory
says that P and F have to enter interacted with publicness and α.
Once interacted are the only ones to significant.
The disappearance of the effects of P and F once interactions
are introduced suggests that ethnicity matters, not intrinsically
[primordialists], but rather instrumentally. The model works
well with both high intensity civil wars [PRIO-C] and smaller scale
social unrest [ISC]. No regional effects: we use regional controls.
Also have repeated the exercise by removing one continent at a
time.
Caveat: the results do not exclude that economic class differ-
ences might also be relevant. In research agenda.
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Class versus Ethnic Conflict
We have just seen that ethnic divisions are a determinant of
social conflict, but only when they are combined with social and
economic gains.
But why such social and economic gains are not channelled
through class alliance?
Now I will discuss why it is easier to form ethnic alliances rather
than class alliances.
Economic demarcation across classes is a two-edged sword:
while it breeds resentment, the very poverty of the have-nots de-
prives them from the means for a successful insurrection.
Across-group heterogeneity coupled with within-group homo-
geneity has been seen as a necessary condition for conflict.
My own work with Debraj Ray on polarization exploits this plausible
idea.
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Indeed, internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity permit
common and well defined group goals.
But what if successful activism demands various inputs?
Successful movements require finances, effective organisation,
intellectuals turning emotions into manifestos, grass-root militants...
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Indeed, internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity permit
common and well defined group goals.
But what if successful activism demands various inputs?
Successful movements require finances, effective organisation,
intellectuals turning emotions into manifestos, grass-root militants...
The argument I want to develop is the following:
When effectiveness in conflict requires various and distinct inputs,
within-group heterogeneity might increase, rather than reduce the
group’s fighting efficiency.
Specifically, let me consider the role of heterogeneity when money
and bodies are both necessary for conflict.
Does income inequality across groups or within groups fuel ethnic
conflict?
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Class versus Ethnic Conflict
Consider the case of a society divided on an ethnic issue. Each
ethnic group will be heterogeneous because there will be rich and
poor.
Success needs both monetary contributions and activists or-
ganising activities, demonstrations, or even violent resistance.
Quite naturally the rich will contribute the money and the poor
the activism.
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What happens if income inequality within the ethnic group in-
creases?
The rich have become richer and the poor poorer.
The rich will contribute more money and the poor will be
cheaper to mobilise: the level of activism will go up.
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What happens if income inequality within the ethnic group in-
creases?
The rich have become richer and the poor poorer.
The rich will contribute more money and the poor will be
cheaper to mobilise: the level of activism will go up.
What happens if income differences between the two ethnic
groups increase?
The rich will contribute more but the activists will be more
expensive to mobilise.
Hence, income diversity across ethnic groups has ambiguous
effects.
What happens when society is divided into economic classes?
The poor have little money and hence will hardly be able to
oppose effective activism.
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Class versus Ethnic Conflict
What kind of alliance will we see, class or ethnic?
Suppose there are two ethnic groups and two economic classes.
The poor are a majority and one of the two ethnic groups is larger.
In an ethnic alliance the rich will contribute the finances and
the poor the militants.
If the benefits are the same, the poor of the ethnic majority will
prefer to be in an ethnic alliance rather than in a class alliance.
The rich of the ethnic majority prefer ethnic to class conflict.
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What kind of alliance will we see, class or ethnic?
Suppose there are two ethnic groups and two economic classes.
The poor are a majority and one of the two ethnic groups is larger.
In an ethnic alliance the rich will contribute the finances and
the poor the militants.
If the benefits are the same, the poor of the ethnic majority will
prefer to be in an ethnic alliance rather than in a class alliance.
The rich of the ethnic majority prefer ethnic to class conflict.
Therefore, in case of a threat of class conflict, the rich of the
ethnic majority will prefer to promote ethnic values and precipitate
inter-ethnic conflict. Ethnic: nationalism/separatism, religion, lan-
guage...
Of course, if the gains of the poor from a class conflict are
much larger than from an ethnic conflict we will eventually see
class as the major social cleavage.
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Why more ethnic than class conflict?
[1] Since money is also needed for effective confrontation, eth-
nic alliances are more effective and easy to form.
[2] The rich will strategically induce ethnic cleavages in order
to avoid class conflict.
[3] Conflicts seem to be channelled through ethnic groups. Em-
pirically we find that ethnicity plays a role not by itself but only
when it is instrumental to obtain benefits.
[4] Effective class confrontation is not driven by income inequal-
ity but by income polarisation.
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Why more ethnic than class conflict?
[1] Since money is also needed for effective confrontation, eth-
nic alliances are more effective and easy to form.
[2] The rich will strategically induce ethnic cleavages in order
to avoid class conflict.
[3] Conflicts seem to be channelled through ethnic groups. Em-
pirically we find that ethnicity plays a role not by itself but only
when it is instrumental to obtain benefits.
[4] Effective class confrontation is not driven by income inequal-
ity but by income polarisation.
How is the distribution of incomes in the US and the EU changing?
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Towards Class Conflict?
We observe a major increase in inequality in the US and the
EU. Picketty: the top 1% have become richer than ever before.
We shall see that there are deeper changes too.
The situation has become so extreme that even the OECD and
the IMF make strong statements in favour of greater redistribution.
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Towards Class Conflict?
We observe a major increase in inequality in the US and the
EU. Picketty: the top 1% have become richer than ever before.
We shall see that there are deeper changes too.
The situation has become so extreme that even the OECD and
the IMF make strong statements in favour of greater redistribution.
Warren Buffett: “There is class warfare, all right, but it is my
class, the rich class, that is making war, and we are winning. NYT
26 November 2006.
Headline of Time magazine 1 April 2014: “There is a Class
War Going On and the Poor Are Getting Their Butts Kicked”
Headline of The Observer 30 November 2014: “Class war is
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Let us examine the change in the distribution of incomes.
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Changes in the income distribution: US, UK, Germany,
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Changes in the income distribution: US, UK, Germany,
Spain
0-68
Changes in the income distribution: US, UK, Germany,
Spain
Great changes in how the market pays individuals. Still to be
explained...
Major stress on the welfare system to compensate for a more
uneven distribution.
Disappearance of the middle working class with incomes about
the mean.
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Changes in the income distribution: US, UK, Germany,
Spain
Great changes in how the market pays individuals. Still to be
explained...
Major stress on the welfare system to compensate for a more
uneven distribution.
Disappearance of the middle working class with incomes about
the mean.
Increase in income distances [alienation], but decrease in group
identification.
We might observe signs of discontent but not much of class
organised effective militancy because of lack of group identification.
We may more easily see discontent channelled through ethnic
expressions.
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